COMERPAPER-public document - HQMC-HistCntr

1976 review by Major Andrew G. COMER, USMC Ret.

of: draft manuscript: US Marines in Vietnam, 1965

The Landing and Buildup.

Copy typed by CWO Ed -W. NICHOLLS, (1:32 AM 2/13/99)

USMC-SSgt/USArmy(AUS) Ret.

PART 1..

(Official Letterhead 1stMarDiv, CJHP.CA.

17 November 1976

To: Director of Marine Corps History and Museums

Headquarters, United States Marine Corps

Washington D.C. 20380

Dear Sir:

I have reviewed the draft manuscript of U. S. Marines in Vietnam, 1965:

The Landing and Buildup, as requested in your letter od 2 September 1976.

I thank you for the opportunity to do so, for as a direct participant in

some of the major actions related in Chapter 5 of the manuscript, and one

who most vividly remembers them, I found certain portions which were not

correct.

In the interest of accuracy of the manuscript, and for the official

Marine Corps historical files, I am submitting a statement in narrative

form which I hope will clarify some of the actions of 3d Battalion, 3d

Marines during Operation STARLITE in August of 1965.

I request that my statement be examined and that the following sections

of the draft manuscript be revised in order to present a more correct

account of 3/3's part in Operation STARLITE.

Page 125, 1st Paragraph (Minor Point)

COMMENT:

To the very best of my vivid recollections, Colonel PEATROSS was not on

the helicopter reconaissance flight cited in the manuscript. (This is

not intended to be at all derogatory towards this fine Marine, he just

was not aboard as I remember.)

Page 130, 1st Paragraph (Minor Point)

COMMENT:

One Marine from Company L wounded. Most of this fire was from an

automatic weapon.

Page 133, 2d Paragraph (Significant Point)

COMMENT:

An Cuong (2) was in an area which was heavily wooded. Visability and fields

of fire were difficult to obtain except in open rice paddy areas and even

these were interspersed with hedgerows of hardwood and bamboo thickets.

Page 136, 1st Paragraph (Significant Point)

COMMENT:

The resupply column was west of An Cuong (2) and consisted of 3 flame

tanks and 5 supply laden LVTs. 1 Flame tank returned to the CP and was

used later in the day to burn off the east side of Hill 30.

Page 137, 138, 2d Paragraphs (Major Point)

COMMENT:

These entire paragraphs are incorrect and should be replaced with

a condensed version of that part of my statement which involves the 3/3 "B"

command group and Company I, reinforced. Most importantly, there were not

two separate actions involving a rescue attempt, and this should be

clearly spelled out.

Please understand that I do not wish to apear to be either trivial or

vainglorious in my statement or comments. I do feel strongly, however,

that if the official document is worth writing it should be correct as

possible, especially so that when active participants are still available

to recount their experiences for the record.

I have discussed the Operation STARLITE portion of the manuscript with

Major J.A. KELLY, the XO of Company I during the period covered who is

currently stationed at Camp Pendelton. We both remember the operation

and are in agreement that my responce is factual to the best of our

knowledge. I still correspond with Mr. PURNELL, who now lives in Long

Beach, California, however, he is currently vacationing in the Orient

and is unavailable to further corroborate my statement.

I personally either authored or edited the award recommendations for

Sergeant R.E. O'MALLEY, Sergeatnt J.M. MULLOY, Sergeant FUCH (12th Marines),

and others fot their actions during Operation STARLITE. My distinct

recollection of the 3/3 post operation reports for this period, which I

helped write, is that they were too brief. We were too busily engaged

(Operation PIRANHA and daily combat operations) at the time for the staff

to write in some incidents which should have been included in our official

records. The untimely death of Lieutenant Colonel MUIR 21 days after our

disengagement from Operation STARLITE prevented a more complete and

factual account from ever being written about 3/3's also "magnificant"

actions. Perhaps my contribution will provide at least a small part of that

missing page in our Marine Corps history book.

As a personal note, I feel that the death of Lieutenant Colonel MUIR as

mentioned on page 165 deserves more attention. He was the first Marine

Corps infantry battalion commander killer in action since World War II,

I understand, and the nature of his death seems to deserve more than a

footnote. I was present at the time of his death and will write a brief

account of this event if you so desire.

One last item; I have about twenty 35mm Kodachrome transparencies of both

the amphibious portion of Operation STARLITE and of the napalm and naval

gunfire strikes to the north of the main positions on 19 August. I have not

seen sililar pictures elsewhere, and will be glad to send them to you for

viewing and possible use if you so desire.

Sincerely,

X

Andrew G. COMER

Major, USMC (Ret.)

ENCLOSURE:

(1) Statement of Major A. G. COMER, USMC (Ret.)

PART 1..(Personal Statement)

[w/minimal annotations of E. NICHOLLS]

Statement of Major Andrew G. COMER, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.),

concerning personal observation, impressions and participation in combat

operations while serving as Executive Officer of 3d Battalion, 3d Marines

during Operation STARLITE, 16 August - 20 August 1965, in the Republic of

South Viet Nam.

At about 1330 on 16 August, 1965 I was summoned to the 4th Marines Command

Post, then located at Chu Lai, South Vietnam, by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph

E. MUIR, then commanding officer, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines. I was informed

that the amphibious assault upon the TRUNG PHAN Peninsula, which we had

frequently discussed and partially planned for, was to be excecute and that

3/3 would make the amphibious landing while Lieutenant J.R. FISHER's 2/4

would land inland by helicopter. Later that day, just prior to dusk, the

two battalion commanders, Captain David A. RAMSEY, the Battalion S-3, and

I made a hurried helicopter reconaissance flight over the objective area in

Major General WALT's personal UH1E helicopter. During this flight we

selected a landing beach and Lieutenant Colonel FISHER selected his

helicopter landing zones. I distinctly remember seeing unidentified

Vietnamese peeking up at us from some of the remote wooded areas. The

flight was hurriedly and circuitous so as to be less obvious. Upon

returning to the 4th Marines CP, we all assembled in a briefing tent and

reviewed the flight and what we saw. I discussed the beach areas at some

length with Liutenant Colonel MUIR. I remember Lieutenant Colonel FISHER

thrusting his large thumbs at the map as he stated boldly, "I'll land here,

here and here!". The two battalion commanders then departed for the

4th Marines command tent to meet with Colonel PEATROSS and staff, and I

returned to the 3/3 CP to commence preparations.

Planning was expidited for 3/3, as we already had a similar operation on

paper, but in spite of that advantage, it was only with maximum effort that

we were able to commence loading on the 17th over the Chu Lai beach and

causeway. We carried out our amphibious assault as planned at about 0630,

18 August 1965, over a sandy "Green Beach" into a villiage called

An-Cuong (1).

The landing was conducted smootly, except that the 3/3 primary ("A")

command group landing craft became stuck for about twenty minutes on a

submerged sandbar about 400 meters off the beach. Company L and the

secondary ("B") command [end of page] command group landed after our

landing craft (LCM-8) also struck a submerged sandbar at high speed,

causing numerous minor injuries to those embarked because of the sudden

impact. We were able to retract and still land ahead of the "A" group,

however. Companies I (left) and K (right) maneuvered as planned until

"A" group landed. One LVT in the Company I sector detonated a smal

explosive charge as it entered the village (no injuries) and one Marine

from Company L [?] was hit by automatic fire from the bluffs to the right

of the beach. This fire was soon repressed by Company K. Major General

WALT and Colnel DULAKI landed by helicopter on the center of the beach

soon after the "A" group landed. There were a few wounded civilians on

the beach which Colnel DULACKI concerned himself with through the 3/3

surgeon.

By 0830, Companies I and K had moved inland, the 7th Marines CP had

moved ashore and also inland towards An Cuong (2). The 3/3 "B" group

accompanied them for mutual security and to better monitor the Company

I sector action, asa well as to set up a teporary LSA for 3/3 supplies

Captain H.T. KERR, the Battalion 3-4, was then efficiently moving ashore.

During this entire period, those of us in thenewly established regimental

CP were receiving sporadic small arms fire from Hill 30, a small brush

covered hill to our immediate west. Tank machine gun fire and finally,

much later in the day a flame tank, silenced this fire.

The "B" group was in constant contact with the "A" group throughout the

morning by radio and the battalion tactical situation was kept current.

Personal discussions with Colonel PEATROSS and staff kept us up on the

entire tactical situation.

At about noon, Lieutenant Colonel MUIR directed that our mobile (LVT)

resupply [21] be sent to Company I, which was then located only a few

hundred yards to our front. (The exact coordinates are now forgotten).

The section officer in charge of the 5 LVTs was thoroughly briefed on his

mission. His present location, destination and route there were marked

on his map prior to his departure. The only tactical support available was

a section of three flame tanks, whose leader was similarly briefed. The

LVTs carried normal resupply items, especially much needed water and

ammunition. An unknown number of 3/3 oersonnel under the direction of

Sergeant MARINO (whom I [end of page] vaguely remember) and Sergeant J.M.

MULLOY (whom I distinctly remember) accompanied this column. The LVT

officer was 2d Lieutenant (ARMSTRONG, I believe). He was reportedly one

of the very first killed as he peered out of a LVT hatch.

A short time after the supply column [call sign "21"] departed, we received

word on the LVT command net (the LVT platoon commander in support of 3/3

was with the "B" group for the entire operation), that the column was

surrounded by VC and was about to be overrun. The LVT radion operator kept

the microphone button depressed the entire time and pleaded for help. We

were unable to quiet him sufficiently to gain essential information as to

their location. This continued for an extended period, perhaps an hour.

Meanwhile, I advised Lieutenant Colonel MUIR of the supply column situation

and was advised that he would send Company I, and that I was to gather

whatever other support I could, and to rescue them as rapidly as possible.

I advised Colonel PEATROSS of my intended actions (although he was by

then aware of it) and from him obtained the single available M-48 gun tank

for support.

Company I arrived at the CP shortly after. A hurried briefing was held for

the leaders and a plan for using a rapidly moveing tank, LVT and Ontos

column through the previously cleared An Cuong (2) area to the supply column

was presented. (All of us had worked together before, with the exception

of the officer in the M-48 tank, whom we did not know). At about this time,

one of the flame tanks that had been with the supply column returned to the

CP. The crew chief, a Staff Srgeant, reported to me that he had just passed

thought An Cuong (2) without being fired upon and that he could lead us

to the LVT supply column. He was to ride in the gun tank which would lead

the remainder of the vehicles of the rescue force.

Shortly after, at about 1300, we departed the 7th Marines CP as planned.

After traveling only about 400 meters, the column lurched to a sudden halt,

just after cresting Hill 30. (later investigation revealed that the gun tank

had been hit in the bow aror by a small AT weapon and had stopped suddenly.)

The rapidly moveing vehicles were immediately jammed together and

simultaneously mortar and small arms fire saturated the area. Not knowing

at the time the nature of the damage nor the enemy situation, I had

Lieutenant PURNELL disembark and deploy Comapany I to return fire to our

[end of page] front, which they did. Several dead and wounded were pulled

behind the lead LVT which had by now been disabled by mortar fire. The tank

proceeded to back up, ramming into the LVT behind it, and then manuvered to

the right to conceal itself behind some tall trees. Attempt to talk to the

tank by radio or get its attention from outside were unsuccessful. The tank

infantry phone had been smashed flat against the LVT and was useless. The

Ontos (Lieutenant MALLOY) also deployed to return frontal fire and protect

the flanks and LVTs. The intensity of the enemy fire abated, but did continue

sporadically from the heavily wooded right front for as long as we occupied

this position.

Lieutenany J.A. KELLY, XO, Company I commenced evacuating casualties via

helicopter called in by Leiutenant H.L. SCHWEND, the "B" group air officer.

Lieutenant PURNELL and I formulated a plan to continue our advance on foot,

clear the An Cuong (2) area (once more) and continue the search for the LVT

column, which we still had contact with. (I gave a AN/PRC-25 radion

normally used for the regimental command net to the LVT platoon commander

when we moved away from our vehicles so that we could maintain contact with

the supply column). Reports to the 7th Marines of our actions were made for

us via Lieutenant Colnel MUIR, as he deemed appropriate.

The loss of too many key personnel in Company I as a result of both prior

"mixmaster" losses and new combat losses now showed its adverse affect.

Even Lieutenant PURNELL, the unit commander [previous CO Captain WEBB, KIAd

in early morning of the 18th], had been in the unit but a few days, he also

being a "mixmaster" replacement from 2/3 in the Da Nang sector. He most

understandably had great difficulty in reorganizing the unit, which it was

necessary to do before continuing, and this took time,which I gave him.

His unit strength at this time had been reduced by about 30%, leaving him

less than 100 effectives. The individual leadership displayed by various

officers and Staff Noncommissioned Officers of that unit was commendable

and professional in nature.

Artillery fire was called upon the wooded area to our front by Sergeant

FUCHS of the 12th Marines and Lieutenant SCHWEND was able to call in air

(primarily helicoper gunships) also. It was obvious that the VC were

deeply dug in, and emerged above ground only when we presented them with

an opportunity, and withdrew underground whenever we retaliated [end of

page] or threatened them. During this hectic and confused period,

Corporal R. E. O'MALLY of Company I and his two battered squads enter our

position. I spoke with them briefly and Lieutenant PURNELL directed them

to Lieutenant KELLY in our rear for evacuation. A number of VC had circled

to our rear though the trees to Hill 30, and Lieutenant KELLY was busy

trying to silence their fire, which was threatening the helicopters and

wounded. Corporal O'MALLY and his troops arrived in time to enter one more

firefight, and were forced to continue firing all the way to the

helicopters. Private P.L. RIMPSON of O'MALLY's squad, was evacuated

to Chu Lai, but decided he wasn't hurt that badly and after "borrowing" a

M-14 from the airfield, hitchhiked back to I Company on a returning

evacuation helicopter.

A platoon of H 2/4 also entered our lines at this time. They were cut off

from their unit, had no radio, and were carrying both dead and wounded

with them. I placed them under my command until we could return them to

their unit or the 7th Marines CP. I directed that they move to Lieutenant

KELLY's position in our rear and evacuate their casualties through him.

_______________

|[At this point:I know for sure I'm neither going to hell nor heaven when I

| pass on. St. Peter's, going to say "Over there ED, that's where you'll be

| for eternity". It's a door. Two signs are there. One say (over the door)

| "COPY TYPEING ROOM" the other sign says "No beverages. No Rest Rooms.

| No smoking, Beans only: for breakfast, lunch and dinner".]***ewn

When Company I was prepared to advance into An Cuong (2) (about 1500) it

did so, against minimal opposition. As I tried to follow them almost

immediately afterwards with the "B" command group, we came under intense

fire from the right front and had to take cover in the middle of open

paddies. Company I had advance to far to aid us, and the H 2/4 platoon

to our rear (200 meters) was able to give us only limited support, due to

poor visability and being pressed by the VC in our rear. An attempt to use

our single machine gun to cover us as we attempted to rejoin Company I

resulted in the immediate deaths of Lance Corporal J.L. WHITE and Private

First Class W.L. SMITH of Company I, who were moving with "B" group for

security. I noted that the only weapons present were pistols and one

captured M-1 rifle with its stock shot away. Mortar fire fell around us,

wounding at least myself that I remember, and automatic weapons fire kept

us pinned down whenever we attempted to move.

When it became obvious that I could not move the "B" group in either

direction without further needless loss of life, I radioed instructions to

Lieutenant PURNELL to continue the mission to locate and extricate the

supply column as rapidly as he could as I deemed that the most urgent

matter, and that I would support him from my present position as best I

could. (I had communications with air, artillery and [end of page] the

LVT supply column). I also advised Lieutenant Colnel MUIR of our situation

as I had been doing all day. Somewhat later he informed me that he would

send a unit (Company L, 3/7) to the position to my right front, that he

would accompany it, and that we were to consolidate and unite all 3/3 units

in the area. I advised him again of the strong VC position to our right

front, which we had fired artillery and called air strikes on, and he

acknowledge. Later, I was able to get glimpses of Company L, 3/7 through

the trees as they advanced on our right flank. At this time and for the

first time all day, I lost contact with the 3/3 "A" group. Exactly what

happened between Company L, 3/7 and the VC we could not tell, however a

brief but furious fire fight occurred and a considerable amount of mortar

fire saturated the entire area, (including ours). Darkness fell shortly

PART 3..(Personal Statement)

[w/minimal annotations of E. NICHOLLS]

Company I continued searching for the supply column with negative results

until after dark, although the trapped LVT personnel had muchearlier

reported that they were no lomger being threatened. (disabled vehicles and

uncertainty prevented them from withdrawing to friendly positions, so

they remained in place). Company I had sporadic, but significant contact

and suffered some casualties. Lieutenant SCHWEND requested medevac

helicopters which responded promptly, but were hindered in finding the LZ

because the only night signal device available were flashlites and the

pilots reported seeing "flashlites all over the place" whenever Company I

was told to mark with them. We were sure the VC were monitoring our nets d

ue to the excellent timing they displayed. The evacuation was finally

accomplished successfully and Company I continued their search in the

dark. At about midnight either Lieutenant Colonel MUIR or I ordered

Company I to return to my position, as the LVTs could not be located.

We had to cease fire of illumination in order to withdraw them, as the

number of VC in the area prohibited them from moving in the artificial

light.

I was afterwards told that in the dark the Company I column had become

intermixed with withdrawing VC column at one point, causing considerable

excitement on both sides. The situation was too confused for eithe side

to fire. This was related to me by several Company I personnel. During the

black out period, I consolidated the "B" group, established physical

contact with Lieutenant KELLY in our rear and awaited the return of

Company I. While waiting, several VC ran nearly on top of us in what

looked like an effort to escape to the south. I retrospect, it is perhaps

[end of page] fortunate they surprised us so much that no engagement

occurred, as our small, exposed and lightly armed group would have

suffered intensely in any type of firefight. When Company I returned to

our positions we moved to Hill 30 and established a perimeter in

conjunction with Lieutenant KELLY's small force. The hill still contained

one disabled LVT (the other 4 having been returned to the regimental CP

earlier as did the gun tank, Ontos, and H 2/4 platoon). A water party

obtained the first fresh water in nearly 40 hours for Company I from the

3/3 supply point in the regimental CP. I moved the "B" group back to the

regimental CP at daylight, reported my actions briefly to Colonel PEATROSS

and staff, whom I had not been in contact with because of lack of radios

and, of course, the normal 3/3 command net responcibility. At about 0800,

Company I became regimental CP security and the "B" group rejoined the 3/3

"A" group at its CP with companies L and K to the north of our previous

areas of action, functioning there until 3/3 was withdrawn from the

operation on 20 August 1965.

In conclusion, for the purpose of clarification, I must comment upon

certain incidents or problems encounted which eventually combine to

produce positive results.

First, the urgency of sending the LVT resupply colum out at mid-day was

based upon the fact that Company I had been hurriedly withdrawn from a

company sized combt operation on the afternoon of 17 August. The entire

company was rushed aboard the LST VERNON COUNTY direct from the field.

The unit was essencially out of water at this time and the frsh water

supply on the LST was contaminated so that only milk was available for

drinking. Accordingly, theylanded and operated with little or no water

until early in the morning of 19 August, a period of nearly 40 hours.

It is noteworthy that no one from that unit was evacuated due to heat

exhaustion, as 18 August was a very hot day. [95-110]

Secondly, the inability of any forces to locate the lost supply column.

Company I made a desperate attempt to locate it and certainly must have

come close. The Marines in the column had no idea where they were,

although we made countless efforts to identify their position in relation

to overhead helicopters, nearby artillery fire and, at night, flares

etc., via radio. None of this proved successful. Numerous tanks and Ontos

had earlier criscrossed the paddies in the An Cuong (2) area so that there

were no definate tracks to follow. Lieutenant SCHWEND made repeated

requests to aircraft operating overhead for a sighting and coordinates

without success. Recent conversations with Lieutenant [end of page] Colonel

L.J. CHILDERS, then the commanding officer, HMM-361, who made numerous low

altitude flights over the entire operating area, on 18 August 1965,

revealed that he never did see the lost vehicles in spite of his obvious

proximity to them.My personal opinion is that the column was further north

than Company I was able to go under the circumstanses due to the enemy

activity and they simply couldn't be located until the next morning when

the VC had departed the area. (Please note that all casualties were

incurred in the early minutes of the supply column-VC encounter and that

their situation remained essentially stable for the remainder of the day

and night.) {some 60 VC dead were scattered at this ambush site, later

viewed by 3/7-ewn]

Third, the significance of diverting Company I (reinforced) from its

primary offensive mission to that of search and rescue. One must consider

the entire days operations in order to evaluate this properly. My analysis

of what occurred that day in this sector of operation indicates that:

1. The supply column ran into a concentration of VC troops which had not

been previously engaged that day.

2. The rescue efforts of Company I (reinforced) further diverted or

checked offensive actions on the part of the VC unit by inserting itself

in front of the 7th Marines CP for an extended period of time.

3. The movement by Company I to the west of An Cuong (2) and the

positioning of the "B" command group in the paddies and the Company I

rear on Hill 30 further threatened their positions and spoiled their

offensive plans, fixing them in place.

4. The amount of fire placed on them by our air and artillery, and by

Lieutenant Colonel MUIR's movement of Company L, 3/7 and tanks right into

them at dusk all combined to force them from the field that day.

Participants will remember the exposed and virtually undefended open rice

paddy position of the 7th Marine CP, the sniper fire from Hill 30 adjacent

to it, establishing that elements of the VC unit were already on that hill

and and aware of the CP location and lastly, the densely wooded areas

which connected An Cuong (2) and Hill 30, which would have permitted the

movement of troops right into the CP. It was the common opinion of

participants from that sector, that the 7th Marines CP would have been

attacked in force that afternoon or evening had not our actions, both

planned and unintentional, not occurred to prevent it. The final

[end of page] analysis should indicate that our actions were appropriate

and tactilly significant, much more than anyone realized at the time.

X

Andrew G. COMER

Major USMC (ret)

17 November 1976

[separate page]

Camp Pendelton, California

Statement of Major J.A. KELLY, USMC, Executive Officer of

Company I, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines during Operation STARLITE,

18-20 August 1965.

I have reviewed the attached statement of Major A.G. COMER USMC (ret)

regarding the actions of Company I (Rein) and the secondary command group

of the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines during Operation Starlite. Regarding those

events which I either observed or participated in, I find the statement to

be factual to the best of my knowledge and ability to recollect.

x

J.A. KELLY

NOTES:

1 Subj: Re: COMER Part 3...

Date: 2/17/99 1:37:24 AM Central Standard Time

From: swi@sat.net (John R. Kuck)

Reply-to: swi@sat.net

To: ENich33023@aol.com

Hello Ed,

Sorry to take so long to get back to you. Owning a flight school is very

demanding and when I get home at night all I want to do is sleep. And I'm

suppose to be retired.

I was reading over Part 2 of the "COMER PAPER" and thought I would put my two

cents worth in or at least get my name spelled right. I was the Artillery

Liaison NCO from the 12th Marines and was with Major Comer during Operation

STARLITE. I was also with him when he was wounded.

On page 3 of 5, last paragraph Sergeant FUCHS should be changed to read Staff

Sergeant KUCK of the 12 th Marines.

Overall I think Major Comer did a good job writing this up, but I believe

there is a whole chapter missing. But that's my opinion and you know what they

say about opinions. Maybe we can talk about it sometime.

During Operation STARLITE Major Comer recommended me for and I received a

Bronze Star With a Combat "V" for Heroism for which I will always be grateful.

I should also note that I was on Hill 55 during "Rice Straw" (It was actually

called "Rice Straw Golden Fleece") as an Artillery FO and about 20 meters from

Lt.Col MUIR when he stepped on a bobby trapped 155mm Howitzer round. (Not a

land mine). All for now.

John R. Kuck